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Microsoft Corporation  
vs.  
The U.S. Court of Justice and the European Community 
 
 
Francisco J. Lorca
♦ 
 
 
Quousque tandem abutere, Microsoft, patientia nostra?
1 
(How long, o Microsoft, will you abuse our patience?) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Microsoft was founded on April 4, 1975 by Bill Gates and Paul Allen to develop and sell BASIC 
interpreters for the Atari 8000. Thirty years later, Microsoft is a global company with presence in 
almost every country in the world with annual revenues of $60.43 billion. Although it develops, 
manufactures, and licenses a wide variety of software products for computing devices, Microsoft is 
best known for its Windows operating System and Microsoft Office suite. Nonetheless, Microsoft is 
also responsible for products such as the Xbox 360, Windows Live, and Windows Mobile, and has a 
strong presence in other markets via the MSNBC cable television network, the MSN Internet portal, 
or the Microsoft Encarta multimedia encyclopedia launched in 1993. 
Microsoft became an international company when it opened in Japan in 1978 and it became a 
public company when the company launched its first Initial Public Offering (IPO) in 1986. The 
initial plan was to offer 2.5 million shares at $21 per share; however, the demand was such that the 
initial offering had to be raised to 3.095 million shares. The closing price for Microsoft shares on 
the first day of trading was $27.75.
2  This meant that at the first day of trading, there were two new 
billionaires;  Gates  who  owned  45  per  cent  of  the  company’s  outstanding  shares  worth  $233.9 
million  and  Allen  who  owned  roughly  25  per  cent.
3  By  the  year  2000,  Microsoft  had  created 
approximately 10,000 millionaires.
4   
The company trades in the NASDAQ under the MSFT ticker symbol and it employees almost 
96,000 employees worldwide with a net income of $17.68 billion as of June 30, 2008. Figure 1 
shows the evolution of Microsoft’s price since its IPO in 1986. 
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1 This is a Latin phrase that originally says: Quosque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra? It was written by 
Marcus  Tullius  Cicero  as  the  introductory  phrase  of  his  first  speech  against  Catilina  that  translate  as  “How  long,  o 
Catiline, will you abuse our patience? 
    
2  Carol  Smith  Monkman.  1986.  Microsoft  stock  is  red  hot  in  first  trading  day.  Microsoft  Blog. 
http://blog.seattlepi.nwsource.com/microsoft/archives/102018.asp (accessed February 2, 2009) 
    
3 Evan L. Marcus. 1999. The world’s first trillionaire.  Wired.  Issue 7, 09.  
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/7.09/trillionaire.html (February 27, 2009). 
    
4  Julie  Bick.  2005.  The  Microsoft  millionaires  come  of  age.  The  New  York  Times.  May  29. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/29/business/yourmoney/29millionaire.html   4   
 
 
 
However, Microsoft has been accused of market domination, predatory tactics, and bullying the 
competition, allegations that have ended in a number of antitrust litigations not only in the U. S. 
Court  of  Justice  but  in  the  European  Commission.  Microsoft’s  litigation  problems  are  both 
governmental and private. While at the governmental level Microsoft has been ruled against by both 
the U.S. Court of Justice and the European Commission, at a private level, Microsoft has had legal 
disputes with Apple, and Alcatel-Lucent among others.  
 
 
From Albuquerque to dominating the World Wide Web 
 
Microsoft began to forge its future when it launched Microsoft Word, or “Word” alone, in 1983. 
Word’s success rested, on the one hand, on the fact that it was the first user-friendly application 
capable of displaying text in what became known as WYSIWYG – What You See Is What You Get.  
On the other hand, it used a rather innovative distribution system bundling free demos with the 
November 1983 issue of PC World.
5 However, Microsoft sealed its future when it developed the 
Disc Operating System (DOS). Microsoft joined forces with IBM in 1981 and signed a contract by 
which  Microsoft  were  to  provide  IMB’s  Personal  Computer  (PC)  with  a  version  of  the  CP/M 
operating  system.      Microsoft  bought  a  CP/M  clone  from  Tim  Paterson  of  Seattle  Computer 
Products and renamed it PC-DOS to be used in IBM’s PC. In 1983, Microsoft decided to create, 
with the help of other companies, its own home computer system called MSX which contained 
Microsoft’s version of DOS operating system. Consequently, the MSX-DOS was born when many 
companies were flooding the “home computers market” with different versions of the IBM PC.  
This is when the “home computers industry” and market became a reality and the quest began when 
Microsoft realized that the new market for home computers was the market to conquer.  
After launching Word, Microsoft introduced Microsoft Works in 1987. Works was a limited 
office program which, in 1989, was “substituted” by Microsoft Office, the company’s best selling 
product. However, Microsoft had not forgotten the importance of a potent operating system and, in 
                                                           
     
5 Roy A. Allen. 2001. Microsoft in the 1980s. In History of the Personal Computer: The People and the Technology. 
Allan Publishing. http://www.retrocomputing.net/info/allan/eBook12.pdf (accessed January 10, 2009).   5   
1990, launched Windows 3.0
6 which soon not only began to generate more revenues for Microsoft 
than MS/DOS but also became the preferred PC platform.  By 1992 Microsoft was already the 
market  leader  with  Microsoft  Office  when  it  released  Microsoft  Windows  3.1,  overcoming 
competitors with products such as WordPerfect and Lotus 1-2-3. In 1995 Microsoft Windows 95 
was launched with millions of copies sold in just days after it was available to the public.  
However, Microsoft had not realized the importance of the Internet and when Windows 95 was 
released, since the company lacked a web browser to go with it, it improvised and turned to a web 
browser called Mosaic which was licensed to a company called Spyglass. 
  
Spyglass, Inc was an Internet software company founded in 1990 whose aim was to 
commercialize various technologies during the early days of the World Wide Web. In 
1995, it licensed the source code for Mosaic to Microsoft and thus, Internet Explorer 
was born.
7  
 
While both companies were associated, the browser was called Mosaic Explorer. However, 
Spyglass  accused  Microsoft  of  not  respecting  the  terms  of  an  agreement  which  according  to 
Spyglass meant that Microsoft had to pay a royalty for every copy sold. Microsoft did not sell any 
copies since it provided it for free with its operating system. A lawsuit forced Microsoft to change 
the name of the product to Internet Explorer 1.0 in its Windows 95 Plus pact launched in 1995.
8   In 
1997, with the released of Microsoft Office 97 and Internet Explorer 4.0, Microsoft positioned itself 
as the leading company in the market. Further, the fact that Microsoft was to provide Internet 
Explorer to Apple Computers strengthened Microsoft’s hegemonic positioning.  
In 2007 Windows Vista and Microsoft Office 2007 were launched and a year later it made an 
unsolicited bid to purchase one of Microsoft major internet services competitor, Yahoo! The bid was 
for  $44  billion  all  payable  in  cash  but  the  offer  was  rejected  and  the  offer  was  withdrawn.
9 
Nonetheless, Steve Ballmer—chief executive officer of Microsoft—stated that “[w] e continue to 
believe that our proposed acquisition made sense for Microsoft, Yahoo! and the market as a whole. 
Our goal in pursuing a combination with Yahoo! was to provide greater choice and innovation in 
the marketplace and create real value for our respective stockholders and employees.”
10  
 
Microsoft and the U.S. Court of Justice 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Microsoft bundled its Internet Explorer web browser within its 
Windows operating system which helped it acquire a dominant position in the web browser market.  
From Microsoft’s point of view, putting these two products together was a way to be “user 
friendly”  for  those  consumers  that  were  not  computer  savvy.  In  reality,  all  that  this  really 
accomplished was making it harder for consumers to choose a different web browser other than 
Internet Explorer. The company reasoned that due to innovation and competition, both products had 
become essentially one, and thanks to this synergy it provided consumers with double the benefits 
for free. Competitors, such as Netscape, stated that the browser was a distinct and separate product 
so  there  was  no  reason  for  it  to  be  automatically  bundled  with  its  operating  system.  Further, 
                                                           
    
6  Windows,  “Windows  history,”  http://www.microsoft.com/windows/winhistorydesktop.mspx  (accessed  January  10,   
2009).  
    
7 Windows, “The Story of Internet Explorer.”  
http://www.microsoft.com/windows/ie/community/columns/historyofie.mspx (accessesed January 10, 2009). 
    
8 Windows, “The story of Internet Explorer.” 
 http://www.microsoft.com/windows/ie/community/columns/historyofie.mspx (accessed February 23, 2009). 
    
9  MSNBC.  2008.  Microsoft  makes  unsolicited  bid  for  Yahoo!  MSNBC.com.  February  1.  
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22947626/ (accessed February 25, 2009). 
     
10  Steve  Ballmer.  2008.  Microsoft  withdraws  proposal  to  acquire  Yahoo!  Microsoft  Press  Pass.  May  3. 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2008/may08/05-03letter.mspx (accessed March 1, 2009).   6   
Microsoft was accused of altering its application programming interfaces to favor Internet Explorer. 
Competitors alleged that if Internet Explorer was sold for the Mac OS, why it had to be tied for free 
with Windows. It was further alleged that the price of Windows remained too high mainly because 
it was taking into account the cost of the operating system.  
The trial for these allegations began on May 1998 and Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson issued 
his “Findings of Fact” on November 5, 1999. In Point 132 the Judge concluded that “Microsoft’s 
interactions with Netscape, IBM, Intel, Apple, and Real Networks all reveal Microsoft’s business 
strategy of directing its monopoly power toward inducing other companies to abandon projects that 
threaten  Microsoft  and  toward  punishing  those  companies  that  resist.”
11  (66)  Furthermore,  he 
concluded that he saw no technical reason that explained Microsoft’s refusal to license Windows 95 
without Internet Explorer. Similarly, Judge Jackson argued that there was “no technical justification 
for  Microsoft’s  refusal  to  license  Windows  95  to  OEMs  with  Internet  Explorer  3.0  or  4.0 
uninstalled, or for its refusal to permit OEMs to uninstall Internet Explorer 3.0 or 4.0” (87). Finally, 
the trial proved that once Internet Explorer was installed, it was very difficult to add any other 
browser due to configuration problems.  In fact, Point 10 in the “Findings of Fact” reads:  
 
Microsoft licenses copies of its software programs directly to consumers. The largest 
part of its MS-DOS and Windows sales, however, consists of licensing the product to 
manufacturer of PCs (known as “original equipment manufacturers’ or “OEMs”), such 
as the IBM PC Company and the Compaq Computer Corporation (“Compaq’). An 
OEM typically installs a copy of Windows onto one of its PCs before selling the 
package to a consumer under a single price.
12 
 
Judge  Jackson  ruled  that  many  of  the  tactics  that  Microsoft  has  employed  have  harmed 
consumers indirectly by unjustifiably distorting competition which violated Sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act. Basically, Microsoft was found guilty of breaching the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), 
name after its author, Senator John Sherman, which limits cartels and monopolies. Based on the 
Sherman Act, Microsoft was found guilty of suppressing competition, but not by the use of illegal 
means.  Competitors agreed that Microsoft used technical barriers as a predatory tactic which made 
it seem as if competitor products did not work with the Windows operating system. In fact, Civil 
Action No. 98-1232 (CKK) agreed that “Microsoft’s operating system monopoly is protected, in 
part, by the applications barriers to entry.” (2) This ruling corroborated the difficulty to use other 
browsers, which helped Internet Explorer quickly acquire a dominant market position.   
This dominant position in the market brought an antitrust case against the company since it 
discourages competition because software developers that enjoy a small market quota will have no 
incentive to develop applications for an operating system that has imposed technical barriers to free 
entry  into  the  industry.    This  situation  would  reduce  the  variety  of  applications  available  to 
consumers who will most likely not switch to any competing systems, thus, destroying competition 
and  competitiveness.  For  this  reason,  the  introduction  of  the  Civil  Action  No.  98-1232  (CKK) 
against Microsoft Corporation (1) read:  
 
[t]he Final Judgments aim to eliminate Microsoft’s illegal practices, to prevent 
recurrence of the same or similar practices and to restore the competitive threat that 
middleware products posed prior to Microsoft’s unlawful conduct … The Final 
Judgment have safeguarded the ability of software developers to develop, distribute, 
and promote competing middleware products.
13  
 
                                                           
    
11  United  of  State  District  Court  for  the  District  of  Columbia.  Civil  Action  No.  98-1232  (TPJ).  2004. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f3800/msjudge.pdf (accessed March 3, 2009). 
    
12 Ibid.  
    
13 Ibid.   7   
Hence, in his “Conclusions of Law” of April 3, 2000, Judge Jackson ruled that Microsoft had to 
be broken into two separate units, one in charge of producing the operating system and the other in 
charge of software development. In fact, he ordered: 
 
[t]he separation of the Operating Systems Business from the Applications Business, 
and the transfer of the assets of one of them (the "Separated Business") to a separate 
entity along with (a) all personnel, systems, and other tangible and intangible assets 
(including Intellectual Property) used to develop, produce, distribute, market, promote, 
sell, license and support the products and services of the Separated Business, and (b) 
such other assets as are necessary to operate the Separated Business as an independent 
and economically viable entity.
 14(1) 
 
Microsoft appealed and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Judge Jackson’s ruling 
against Microsoft. Immediately after, the Department of Justice announced in September 2001 that 
it was no longer seeking to break up the company in two, so the case was settled although a vast 
number of States did not agree with the settlement sanctions. 
 
Political Fallout in the U.S. 
 
All these judicial matters took place when the Clinton Administration was about to leave office.   
The incoming Bush administration was against the break up.
15 In fact, with the benefit of hindsight, 
the change of administration together with a change in legal counsel worked wonders for Microsoft.  
By 2000, Microsoft had learnt the hard way the importance of having a strong lobby presence in 
Washington. Jack Krumholt had represented Microsoft´s interests in Capital Hill since the early 
90´s, however, when the Justice Department filed the lawsuit against the company, “Microsoft – a 
company  famous  for  its  disdain  for  government—undertook  the  largest  government  affairs 
makeover in corporate history.”
16  
        To begin with, Microsoft teamed up with Tech Central Station (TCS). TCS was launched by 
Charles Frances and prominent Republican lobbyist James K. Glassman who “envisioned an entity 
that would cover the nexus between science and technology on the one hand and public policy on 
the other.”
17 In fact, after Microsoft became a sponsor of TCS and its post, a significant number of 
references against the company breakup were reported.  Further, Microsoft substituted William 
Neukon as deputy general council and Brad Smith took his place. Smith´s experience “as general 
council  would  transform  how  Microsoft  interacted  with  governments  and  usher  in  an  era  of 
negotiation, where legal problems were dispatched as quickly as possible.”
18 In fact, it was reported 
that  Microsoft  has  realized  the  importance  of  a  solid  and  sound  lobby  effort.  According  to 
OpenSecrets.org  which  traces  political  contributions  and  lobbying  spending  by  the  Center  for 
Responsive Politics, “Microsoft is projected to spend more than $10 million on lobbying in 2008. In 
2007, Microsoft spent $9 million in lobbying.”
19   
                                                           
    
14 Ibid. 
    
15  Bush  administration  no  longer  interested  in  breaking  up  Microsoft.  2001.  CourtTV  News.  September  6. 
http://www.courttv.com/archive/news/2001/0906/microsoft_ap.html (accessed March 1, 2009). 
    
16Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and  Melanie Nayer. 2002. How Microsoft Conquered Washington By spending lots of money--
of course--but also by doing lots of creative lobbying you don't know about. CNN Money. April 29. 
 http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2002/04/29/321995/index.htm (accessed February 27, 2009). 
    
17 Nicholas Confessore. 2003. How James Glassman reinvented journalism--as lobbying. Meet the Press. December.  
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0312.confessore.html (accessed March  3, 2009). 
    
18  Joe  Wilcox.  2008.  Mr.  Smith  Goes  to  Washington.  Eweek  Microsoft  Watch.  June  5.  http://www.microsoft-
watch.com/content/corporate/mr_smith_goes_to_washington.html (accessed March 5, 2009). 
    
19  Roy  Mark.  2008.  Microsoft  Leads  Tech  Lobbying  Pack.  June  4.  http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Government-
IT/Microsoft-Leads-Tech-Lobbying-Pack/ (accessed February 24, 209).   8   
        Many  scholars  and  politicians  linked  these  events  with  the  lack  of  interest  in  the  Bush 
administration to breakup the company in two and the fact that on September 26, 2001, Judge 
Colleen  Kollar-Kotelly  “ordered  Microsoft  and  the  government  into  a  new  round  of  intensive 
negotiations to settle the long-running antitrust case.”
20  On November 1, 2002 the case was finally 
settled and the agreement aimed to  
ensure Microsoft does not enter into exclusive deals that could hurt competitors  
demand that computer makers develop uniform contract terms  
enable customers and computer makers to remove icons for some Microsoft features  
demand that Microsoft releases some technical data to help software developers to 
write programs that work well with Windows benefit consumers, according to the US 
Justice Department.
21 
However, in 2003-2004 the European Commission began to look into the bundling of Window 
Media  Player  into  Windows.  This  time,  Microsoft’s  legal  problems  had  just  begun  in  the  old 
continent where neither Smith nor the most powerful lobbying mechanism could change the fate of 
the company in the European Union (EU).  
Microsoft and the EU 
 
Microsoft’s legal problems in the EU began on December 10, 1998 when Sun Microsystems 
filed a complaint with the European Commission (EC) regarding Microsoft’s refusal to provide 
interoperability;  that  is,  obstructing  the  ability  of  two  or  more  systems  or  components  to 
exchange information and to use the information that has been exchanged.
22 Sun Microsystems 
alleged that Microsoft had a dominant position in the market of operating systems for personal 
computers  and  it  was  reserving  to  itself  information  that  was  necessary  for  other  software 
products  in  order  to  fully  interoperate  with  Microsoft’s  operating  System.  In  light  of  this 
accusation, Microsoft had infringed Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community.  
In particular, the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Treaty of Rome) states in 
Article  102  that  “The  Member  States  and  the  Community  shall  act  in  accordance  with  the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition, favoring an efficient allocation of 
resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 3a.”  
The Treaty of Rome included in its Part Three, Title V on “Common Rules on Competition, 
Taxation  and  Approximation  of  Laws.”  Chapter  1  is  titled  “Rules  on  Competition”  and  its 
Section I covers Articles 85 through 90 on “Rules Applying to Undertakings.” Based on this, 
Microsoft was accused of not complying with Articles 85 and 86.  Article 85 reads:  
 
1.  The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market; 
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and 
which have as their object or effect the prevention restriction or distortion of 
competition within the common market, and in particular those which:  
o  (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other 
trading conditions;  
o  (b)  limit  or  control  production,  markets,  technical  development,  or 
                                                           
    
20 Ibid.  
     
21 Kevin Anderson. 2002. Microsoft wins battle but war continues. November 1. 
  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/business/2390189.stm (accessed March 8, 2009). 
     
22 Paul Miller. Interoperability: What is it and why should I want it?  
http://www.ariadne.ac.uk/issue24/interoperability/intro.html (accessed March 1, 2009).   9   
investment;  
o  (c) share markets or sources of supply;  
o  (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;  
o  (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties  of  supplementary  obligations  which,  by  their  nature  or  according  to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.  
2.  Any  agreements  or  decisions  prohibited  pursuant  to  this  Article  shall  be 
automatically void.  
3.  The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the 
case of:  
o  any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;  
o  any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;  
o  any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;  
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair 
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
o  (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;  
o  (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition 
in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.  
 
 
Article 86 reads: 
 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
•  (a)  directly  or  indirectly  imposing  unfair  purchase  or  selling  prices  or 
unfair trading conditions;  
•  (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice 
of consumers;  
•  (c)  applying  dissimilar  conditions  to  equivalent  transactions  with  other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;  
•  (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.  
 
Since Microsoft had infringed these two Articles, the Commission—under Council Regulation 
No. 17 of 6 February 1962
23—was allowed to implement Articles 3 and Article 15(2). In particular, 
                                                           
    
23  Council  Regulation  No  17  (6  February  1962).    http://www.ena.lu/council-regulation-17-february-1962-
020002433.html (accessed February 28, 2009).  10   
Article 3 of this Regulation empowered the Commission to bring infringement to an end. Further, 
Article 15 (2) of this Regulation set the fine to be imposed. 
This case was registered as Case IV/C-3/37.345. On August 2000 and after the first 
investigation, the Commission sent Microsoft the “First Statement of Objections” in which the 
Commission  agreed  that  Microsoft  had  abused  its  dominant  position  failing  to  disclose 
information necessary to allow competition.   
On  February  2000,  following  information  obtained  from  the  market,  the  Commission 
broadened the scope of its investigation and launched an “ex officio” investigation to examine 
Microsoft’s  conduct  with  regard  to  the  bundling  of  its  Windows  Media  Player  product  with 
Windows  2000.  This  case  was  filed  as  Case  IV/C-./37.792.  The  Commission  on  August  2001 
decided to merge both cases and the Commission broadened the case against Microsoft.  In the 
Second  Statement  of  Objections  that  the  Commission  sent  to  Microsoft  on  August  2001,  the 
Commission included concern on both interoperability and anti-competitive practices by tying its 
Windows Media Player product with its Windows PC operating system.  
Microsoft responded to Statements of Objections one and two by submitting a total of 46 
statements from customers and system integrators to support its defense against both Statements. 
However, the Commission “engaged in a wider market enquiry (‘’the 2003 market enquiry”) … in 
the light of the findings of the market enquiry and how they related to the Commission’s existing 
objections, a supplementary Statement of Objections was issued on August 6, 2003.”
24 (6-7)  After 
the market enquiry, the Commission sent Microsoft a third “Statement of Objections” and based on 
the findings of the market enquiry which confirmed and consolidated the allegations already stated 
in the two previous Statement of Objections. Upon receiving this Third Statement of Objections, 
Microsoft requested an Oral Hearing that took place on November 2003.  
The end result was that on March 2004 Microsoft was in Case COP/C-3/37.792 condemned 
for refusing to supply competitors with the necessary information for their products to interoperate 
with Windows. This hindered their possibility to compete viably in the market. Further, Microsoft 
was condemned for harming competition through the tying of its separate Windows Media Player 
product with its Windows PC operating system. The Commission, in order to restore the conditions 
of fair competition, imposed the following remedies
25: 
 
As regards to interoperability, Microsoft was required, within 120 days, to disclose 
complete and accurate interface documentation which would allow non-Microsoft 
workgroup servers to achieve full interoperability with Windows PCs and servers. This 
would enable rival vendors to develop products that could compete on a level playing 
field in the workgroup server operating system market. The disclosed information 
would have to be updated each time Microsoft brought to the market new versions of 
its relevant products. 
 
As regards to bundling, Microsoft was required within 90 days to offer PC 
manufacturers a version of its Windows client PC operating system without the WMP. 
The untying remedy did not mean that consumers would obtain PC’s and operating 
systems without media players. Most consumers purchase a PC from a PC 
manufacturer which has already put together on their behalf a bundle of an operating 
system and a media player. As a result of the Commission's remedy, the configuration 
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of such bundles would reflect what consumers wanted, and not just what Microsoft 
imposed. 
 
Basically, the Commission found that Microsoft had abused its dominant position in violation of 
EC law against monopoly behavior in the market for PC operating systems within both the market 
for media players and for workgroup server operating systems. The Commission concluded that 
Microsoft had infringed both Article 82 and 86 of the treaty Establishing the European Community 
and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement.   
 However, on June 7, 2004, Microsoft filed an appeal with the European Court of First Instance 
(CFI) against the European Commission’s Decision. In this appeal, Microsoft claimed that  
 
      the implementation of the Decision would: (i) harm its intellectual property rights; 
(ii) interfere with its commercial freedom; and (iii) irreversibly alter market conditions. 
As regards the tying remedy, Microsoft claimed that the implementation of the 
Decision would: (i) interfere with Microsoft’s commercial freedom by forcing it to 
abandon its "basic design concept" for the Windows PC operating system; and (ii) 
damage Microsoft’s reputation as "a developer of quality software products.
26 
 
On September 17, 2007, the CFI delivered its judgment upholding the findings of abuse in the 
Commission’s decision and further maintained unchanged the fine of €497 million imposed by the 
EC for infringement of Articles of the Treaty. Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes stated that  
 
     The Court has upheld a landmark Commission decision to give consumers more 
choice in software markets. That decision set an important precedent in terms of the 
obligations of dominant companies to allow competition, in particular in high tech 
industries. The Court ruling shows that the Commission was right to take its decision. 
Microsoft must now comply fully with its legal obligations to desist from engaging in 
anti-competitive conduct. The Commission will do its utmost to ensure that Microsoft 
complies swiftly.
27 
This fine was paid in full on June 29, 2004; however, in July 2006 the Commission again fined 
the company for not complying with the 2004 ruling. In fact, the Commission imposed a daily fine 
of €1.5 million from December 16, 2005 to June 20, 2006, totaling €280.5 million, for its failure to 
disclose interoperability information.  Finally, in October 2007 the Commission announced that 
Microsoft was in full compliance with the 2004 decision.
28 
The EU’s Quest to Defend Competition within the EU 
 
The EC fought this case tooth and nail for both political and economic reasons. On the political side, 
the EC wanted to make sure that the EU was taken seriously. In each Treaty, the EU remarks the 
importance of free competition to bust and enhance labor competitiveness which is the number one 
pillar for a strong economic performance and is tightly linked to economic growth. 
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The Competition Commission oversights eight major sectors: one of them is the Information 
and  Communication  Technologies  (ICT)  which,  according  to  Neelie  Kroes,  Competition 
Commissioner, has become a cornerstone of the Lisbon Strategy.
29 The Lisbon Strategy states that 
the “ICT represents both a major challenge and a significant opportunity for job creation.”
30 Further, 
as  new  members  started  to  join  the  EU,  the  Commission  released  a  communication  titled:  “A 
proactive  competition  policy  for  a  competitive  Europe.”
31  In  this  document,  the  importance  of 
competition as a major milestone for competitiveness and economic growth was reinstated. In fact, 
the communication stated that “the new competition regulatory framework which entered into force 
on the day when 10 new Member States joined the EU, i.e. 1 May 2004, enhances the basis for a 
pro-active competition policy” (1)  
For the Commission, Microsoft’s actions were hindering EU’s efforts to create jobs and foster 
competitiveness,  innovation,  and  entrepreneurship  in  making  the  EU  attractive  to  investors  and 
workers. However, Microsoft counter attacked publically stating that the EC was clearly attacking 
the right to private property, hence destroying the incentive to innovate, and ultimately hurting 
consumers. 
In any case, this battle is not over yet. The EC is still scrutinizing Microsoft’s every move to the 
point that the EC is now investigating Microsoft’s dominance in desktop applications such as Word 
and Excel. The Commission has found that government documents should be created in the Open 
Document Format (ODF) which is a direct competitor to the proprietary format used in Microsoft 
Word. In fact, during the recent German Presidency, a “Workshop on Open Documents Exchange 
Formats (ODEF)”
32 took place in Berlin which concluded with a “strong consensus on the necessity 
to opt for ODEF, as these formats were assessed as guaranteeing “openness” for the participation of 
stakeholders  and  the  freedom  of  choice.”    If  across  the  board  users  begin  to  work  with  ODF, 
Microsoft will suffer a tremendous loss of its market share. 
 
Final Word 
 
This paper has attempted to summarize Microsoft’s business practices and litigation problems in 
both the U.S. and the EU. While in the U.S. the case seems to be over and no further actions are 
expected to be taken, the EC is still on the case in setting the record straight.  
The Bush administration broke one of the most sacred political tenets: separation of powers 
between the judicial branch and the other two branches of government, particularly the executive, 
by  not  allowing  Judge  Jackson  judgment  and  sentence  to  be  implemented.  This  action  totally 
hindered competition and was a direct attack to the constituents who elect governments whose 
primary  goal  should  be,  in  turn,  to  defend  and  improve  citizens’  well-being.  The  Bush 
administration allowed Microsoft to maintain its dominant position and gave powerful lobbyists 
group  the  right  to  guide  the  destiny  of  a  primordial  sector  which  is  the  Information  and 
Communication Technology one.  Hence, Microsoft’s monopoly and faulty business practices are 
the clear winner and citizens are the losers in this long fought battle. To add insult to injury, their 
illegal market practices have sent both Bill and Melissa Gates to stardom since, as of 2007, they 
ranked as the second most generous philanthropists in America, having given over $28 billion to 
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charity.
33  Billions of dollars that come from profits obtained from selling overpriced product in a 
non-competitive market in which Microsoft has managed to outcast competitors and all in the name 
of  “defending  intellectual  property.”    Hopes  that  free  competition  practices  were  to  be  ever 
operating in this sector is not going to come from the new guest of the White House who is fighting 
a brutal economic recession in the United States. 
It seems that the EU, free from hidden and obscured lobbies’ interests working to advance 
Microsoft’s case among politicians, are fighting to force Microsoft to comply with fair competition 
practices.  The case against Microsoft has turned a tough fight that the EC is not ready to drop 
anytime soon for two reasons. First of all, the reputation of the EC was put in jeopardy when it was 
reported that Microsoft was not complying with the 2004 decision. Secondly, by allowing Microsoft 
to maintain its monopoly, governments are preventing other companies from offering products to 
the  market;  products  whose  quality  and  value-added  to  the  market  should  only  be  decided  by 
consumers and not by Bill Gates and Microsoft. 
Despite facing a tough challenge, the EU has realized that it should take charge to properly 
safeguard this sector. In this sense, the EC should make sure that neither the free market system nor 
a single powerful company is limiting either consumer choice or technological development and 
possible breakthroughs. In order to do so, the EC should follow three paths. First of all, it should 
insulate itself from certain practices that have never been, so far, part of the European business 
culture; i.e. lobbies companies which have become a powerful actor in Washington. Secondly, the 
EC should properly regulate a pivotal sector which has become today a cornerstone to economic and 
social development and prosperity. The same way that the financial market is about to suffer new 
regulations to avoid further fraud and abuses, the EC should regulate this sector to foster fair free 
competition,  new  product  innovation  and  development,  and  honest  entrepreneurship.  Finally,  it 
should make sure that private and personal data and information is safely guarded by companies that 
are neither under profit pressure nor at the mercy of one company which has auto proclaimed itself 
as the ¨decider¨ of what should or should not be produced and offered to consumers. 
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